🔍 Read the full analysis: A Closer Look At Field, Factory, And Office Work on ThorstenMeyerAI.com
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TL;DR
An essay published Nov. 2 by ThorstenMeyerAI.com opens a 60-episode series by tracing the shift from farming to factory and service work. Its figures show long-term changes in employment, while its suggestion that automation could become a separate sector is presented as a thesis, not an established forecast.
ThorstenMeyerAI.com published the first episode of its 60-part series, “Work After Work,” on Nov. 2, using the historical shift from farms to factories and services to frame questions about automation and employment. The article presents sector figures and economic history, then identifies a possible future automation sector as the author’s thesis rather than a confirmed development.
The episode organizes work into three categories: the primary sector, which takes resources from nature; the secondary sector, which makes goods and builds infrastructure; and the tertiary sector, which includes services such as trade, transport, health care, education and government. The categories are useful for tracking employment, the author says, but can be difficult to apply consistently. For example, a software engineer employed by a carmaker may be classified differently across statistical systems.
The article describes a long decline in agriculture’s share of US employment. Citing economic historian Stanley Lebergott’s estimates, it gives farming’s share of the US labor force as 73.7% in 1800, 54.8% in 1850, 40.2% in 1900 and 12.0% in 1950. It also cites an International Labour Organization modelled estimate of 1.5% for 2025. These figures describe shares of employment, not the amount of food produced or the number of workers in every kind of agricultural work.
The episode says the ILO’s modelled estimates put services ahead of farming as a source of jobs worldwide from 2001. It also cites changes in China and Japan: China’s primary-sector share of employment fell from 83.5% in 1952 to 22.2% in 2024, while Japan’s fell from 53.8% in 1920 to 3.2% in 2020. The source presents these as national employment trends, not as directly comparable measures across different statistical systems.
How the Three Sectors Explain Change
The sector framework matters because it makes a major economic transformation legible: societies can produce food and goods with a smaller share of workers in farming and manufacturing, while more people earn a living in services. The source’s figures show that the change has unfolded over generations and at different speeds in different countries. They do not, on their own, explain why it happened or predict what will happen next.
The article also challenges the claim that the United States no longer makes things. It says US factory employment is about 35% below its June 1979 peak, while real manufacturing output in 2025 was about 1.9 times its 1979 level. The distinction is relevant to debates about automation and jobs: output can rise even as fewer workers are employed. The source does not provide further methodological detail in the supplied material, so the figures should be read with their stated measures and dates.
For readers weighing claims about technology replacing work, the key distinction is between a historical pattern and a forecast. The article describes past movement among sectors as a measured trend, but its suggestion that automation could become a sector of its own is explicitly an argument to be tested, not a settled economic outcome.
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The Origins of the Sector Map
The three-sector model took shape in the first half of the 20th century. The article credits New Zealand economist Allan G. B. Fisher with adding “tertiary” to the established terms “primary” and “secondary.” Fisher wrote about the division in the 1930s; his book, The Clash of Progress and Security, was published in 1935. The source says Fisher argued that employment in developing economies shifted from primary work to secondary work and, to a greater extent, services.
Economist Colin Clark applied the framework to comparisons among countries in The Conditions of Economic Progress (1940). He described workers moving from agriculture to manufacturing and then to commerce and services. Clark also observed that industry’s share of employment did not rise indefinitely, according to the account.
French economist Jean Fourastié offered another explanation in 1949: technology could raise output rapidly in industry, while some services were harder to automate or expand in the same way. He expected services to take in workers displaced by machines. The episode sets that historical argument against today’s automation debate, while its author’s future-sector proposal remains a personal thesis.
“The possibility that automation could become a sector of its own, “doing up to 90% of the work with no human hand,” is presented as a thesis.”
— Thorsten Meyer, author of the series
Limits of the Employment Comparisons
The source excerpt does not provide the full underlying tables or definitions for every figure. Statistical categories vary: mining, for instance, is classified as primary in many systems but was placed in the secondary sector by Clark and is classified that way in Japan’s census, according to the article. That limits direct comparisons unless classifications and labor-force definitions are checked.
The figures also track the share of workers in sectors, not the quality or security of their jobs, output per worker, or the causes of employment change. The claim that automation may form a separate sector—and could perform up to 90% of work without human involvement—has no stated timeframe, measurement method or supporting evidence in the supplied text. The author says a later episode will examine that thesis.
Later Episodes Test Automation Claims
“Work After Work” is described as a daily series of 60 episodes on how the economy is built, how work has shifted and which tasks may remain human as machines take on more work. Meyer says the series will revisit the automation-sector thesis in episode 48. The source does not give a publication schedule beyond describing the installments as daily, or additional details about the evidence that episode will use.
For now, the first episode provides a historical framework rather than a new employment forecast. The next installments are expected to develop the series’ account of how workers have moved among sectors and to examine what automation could change.
Key Questions
What is the “Work After Work” series?
It is a 60-episode series published by ThorstenMeyerAI.com about how economies are built, how work changes and how automation may affect human employment. The first episode appeared on November 2, 2026.
What are the three economic sectors?
The primary sector takes resources from nature, the secondary sector makes goods and builds, and the tertiary sector provides services. Statistical systems do not always classify every activity in the same way.
Does the article say the United States no longer manufactures goods?
No. It says US factory employment is about 35% below its June 1979 peak, while real manufacturing output in 2025 was about 1.9 times its 1979 level. Those are different measures: employment and output.
Is automation already a separate economic sector?
The source does not establish that. The idea that automation could become a sector performing up to 90% of work without human involvement is identified by Meyer as his thesis, and the article says a later episode will examine it.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
